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Abstract
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has caused significant human morbidity
and mortality since its emergence in late 2019. Not only have over three million people
died, but humans have been forced to change their behavior in a variety of ways, including limiting their contacts, social distancing, and wearing masks. Early infectious disease
models, like the classical SIR model by Kermack and McKendrick, do not account for differing contact structures and behavior. More recent work has demonstrated that contact
structures and behavior can considerably impact disease dynamics. We construct a coupled
disease-behavior dynamical model for SARS-CoV-2 by incorporating heterogeneous contact
structures and decisions about masking. We use a contact network with household, work,
and friend interactions to capture the variation in contact patterns. We allow decisions
about masking to occur at a different time scale from disease spread which dramatically
changes the masking dynamics. Drawing from the field of game theory, we construct an
individual decision-making process that relies on perceived risk of infection, social influence,
and individual resistance to masking. Through simulation, we find that social influence prevents masking, while perceived risk largely drives individuals to mask. Underlying contact
structure also affects the number of people who mask. This model serves as a starting point
for future work which could explore the relative importance of social influence and perceived
risk in human decision-making.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Background

As of May 20, 2021, coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has taken the lives of over 3.4
million people worldwide, and nearly 588,000 in the US alone [110, 34]. Moreover, nearly
165 million people have been infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID19, some suffering long term health consequences [32, 34, 5, 98, 22]. COVID-19 is not
the first emerging disease to cause substantial human morbidity and mortality; influenza,
HIV/AIDS, and SARS epidemics have also demonstrated the devastation that can result
from novel pathogens [78]. Not only is it hard to predict where and when a new pathogen
will emerge, but after emergence, it takes time to characterize the pathogen and determine
what measures will prevent its spread.
In January of 2020, when newspapers first reported on a mysterious pneumonia in China
[107], little was understood about SARS-CoV-2. Policy-makers and scientists were considering whether the novel virus would cause an epidemic [96, 63]. With evidence of humanto-human transmission and increasing cases in Iran, Italy, and South Korea in March 2020,
it became clear that COVID-19 would cause more than an epidemic but a pandemic [109].
Researchers and policy-makers began deliberating over how to slow the spread of disease:
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Which non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) should be implemented and when? Experts
now agree that masks, social distancing, and avoiding gatherings can slow the spread of
COVID-19, but early in the pandemic the route of disease transmission was less certain
[23, 47]. Moreover, research is still being conducted to understand when it is appropriate to
put each measure in place. Trade-offs between loss of life and loss of freedom and/or income
must be weighed in decisions about lockdown or stay-at-home orders [6, 101, 103]. Although
many aspects of SARS-CoV-2 are still not well understood, substantial progress has been
made since January 2020.
Reaching this level of comprehension was not simple [51]. Initial estimates of epidemic size
and intervention effectiveness depended on unreliable information about the contagiousness
of SARS-CoV-2, number of cases, whom it infects, how it is transmitted, contact patterns
of its human hosts, and how human behavior would evolve over time [38]. With so many
factors at work coupled to large amounts of uncertainty, many in the science community
turned to mathematical models to predict the extent of viral spread and to assess potential
interventions. These models could indicate general trends resulting from different possible
parameters or preventive measures, ultimately informing key policy decisions.
Mathematical models have long been used to study infectious disease dynamics, starting
in the early 1900s. One of the earliest and simplest infectious disease models is the compartmental SIR model introduced by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927 [58]. In this model,
individuals move through three consecutive compartments (S, I, and R) over time. These
compartments represent the course of disease; initially, individuals are Susceptible, then they
become Infectious, and eventually Removed as they recover or die from the disease [58]. The
rate at which individuals move from one compartment to the next is mainly determined by
the transmissibility of the pathogen (governing movement from S to I) and the recovery rate
(governing movement from I to R). Kermack and McKendrick implemented the model using
ordinary differential equations (ODEs). As all models must make assumptions about the biological system of interest, the classic SIR model assumes that: immunity is long-lasting (i.e.,
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there is no return to S from R); that everyone comes into contact with everyone else; that
everyone is equally susceptible; and, that the population size doesn’t change [58]. Over short
time periods and in small communities these assumptions may be reasonable, yet in other
contexts, a model making different assumptions may better capture the underlying process.
As a result, many other disease models have been crafted since Kermack and McKendrick’s
initial publication. Approaches vary depending on the research question being addressed;
some strive to accurately represent realistic contact patterns [73, 97] while others focus on
capturing the possibility of superspreading, when some individuals infect an unusually large
number of people [68].

1.2

Our Contribution

We seek to answer the question: How does the spread of a respiratory virus (we specifically
consider SARS-CoV-2) depend on contact patterns and behavior? To do so, we build a coupled disease-behavior dynamical model that emphasizes the course of infection for COVID-19
cases, heterogeneous contact patterns, and shifting behaviors. Here we will provide a brief
background on previous work in these aspects of disease modeling to situate our contribution. In Chapter 2, we discuss in more detail the expansion of the compartments of our
model beyond S, I, and R to better reflect the stages of COVID-19 infection. Our approach to incorporating heterogeneous mixing and rational decision-making using network
influence games is covered in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. By simulating the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 in different scenarios, we can weigh how different variables, such as resistance
to masking, perceived risk of infection, and social influence, interact and affect patterns of
disease transmission (Chapter 5). The implications of our findings are discussed in Chapter
6.
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Progression of Disease

COVID-19 infection is more accurately described by using additional epidemiological compartments beyond S, I, and R. The SIR progression assumes that individuals become
infectious immediately upon infection and that all individuals are equally infectious. For
many diseases, including measles and COVID-19, this simplification obscures key characteristics of the course of infection [95, 10]. Ergo, modelers may instead use an SEIR model.
Here the E compartment represents individuals who are Exposed to the disease but are not
yet infectious [95]. The Exposed compartment serves as a time delay which can be relevant
when analyzing disease dynamics. Furthermore, individuals infected with COVID-19 can be
infectious before showing symptoms or never show symptoms at all [108]. This asymptomatic
infectious state can be differentiated from symptomatic infectious individuals by using an
SEAIR model where A represents Asymptomatic infectious individuals [100, 101, 12]. We
will use a progression similar to SEAIR in our model to account for these two key features
of COVID-19 infection that aren’t captured by the SIR progression: delay between infection
and infectiousness, and asymptomatic infectious individuals (see Figure 2.2). Further details
about this part of the model can be found in Chapter 2.

1.2.2

Heterogeneous Contact Patterns

Human contact patterns are more variable than the well-mixed SIR model suggests and this
variability affects disease dynamics [104, 9, 75]. For example, humans do not mix equally
with people of all ages; most daily interpersonal contact occurs between people of the same
age group [79, 64]. Modelers can account for this variability in contact patterns in different
ways. One technique in the ODE framework is to create additional compartments within the
epidemiological classes S, I, and R, such that individuals of the same age mix with each other
more than individuals of other age groups [33, 113, 70]. This approach can be generalized
by having different rates of local (within neighborhood) and global (outside neighborhood)
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mixing [8]. Neighborhoods may be broadly defined so that the groupings can be based on a
variety of characteristics, including age and/or spatial location [8].
An alternative approach to describe heterogeneous contact patterns is to use a network
to represent potential disease-spreading interactions [84]. Networks are a collection of nodes
denoting individuals and edges (links between nodes) that denote interactions between individuals. Depending on the research question, modelers may generate random networks
(more in Chapter 3) or build their own network structure to emphasize a particular social
pattern [77]. Social patterns of emphasis may include household contacts or trips to common
locations, e.g. supermarkets or hospitals [71, 92]. Networks have been used to model many
diseases, including influenza [69, 62], smallpox [71, 88], and Ebola [93], as well as COVID-19
[89]. While networks require more computational power than ODEs and are not always analytically tractable (thus requiring simulation), they can often capture complex and varying
contact patterns. We take advantage of these properties in Chapter 3 when building our
own network for COVID-19 transmission.

1.2.3

Shifting Behaviors

Finally, we would like our model to account for shifting human behaviors, such as masking
and social distancing, which can change individual susceptibility to infection and modify
typical contact patterns. Susceptibility is naturally thought to vary throughout populations
[65, 28], but as individuals alter their behavior to prevent infection during an outbreak,
even greater differences in susceptibility may arise [36]. Some people will take precautions,
reducing their susceptibility, and others will not. Likewise, these differing behavioral choices
will alter the typical contact patterns outlined above as some people refrain from spending
time with each other [60, 37]. Consequently, these behaviors can substantially impact disease
dynamics and are important to account for in disease models.
There are several ways to incorporate behavior dynamics into disease models and we
summarize a few of those approaches here. We call these types of models coupled disease5
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behavior dynamical models because the disease and behavior dynamics depend on and are
influenced by one another [106]. Coupled disease-behavior dynamical models can be applied to both homogeneously and heterogeneously mixed populations. Because we will be
using a network to model interactions, we will focus here on how disease-behavior dynamics
have previously been studied on networks. Wang and colleagues summarize a variety of
implementations but ultimately sort these models into four categories based on the type of
network: lattice or static networks, multilayer networks, adaptive or time-varying networks,
and empirically-derived networks [106]. We will focus on static and multilayer networks.
An early coupled disease-behavior dynamical model was designed by Funk and colleagues
in 2009 [41]. Using static networks, the authors proposed that disease awareness would spread
much like disease, except the quality of awareness information would decrease as it got farther
from the source (an infected individual) [41]. Individual disease susceptibility was linked
inversely with the quality of awareness information [41]. To assume that awareness spreads
in the same interactions as disease infection is perhaps unrealistic, so Funk and colleagues
went a step further by using two potentially different networks, one for disease transmission
and another for awareness propagation. This combination of networks is typically called
multilayer or multiplex [61, 42, 43]. These networks have multiple layers composed of the
same set of nodes but different sets of edges. One set of edges reflects potential infectioncausing interactions, while another represents potential information-exchanging interactions
[15]. This separated representation of disease and behavior spread allows the two entities
to spread at different rates and incorporates the reality that information can be exchanged
using current technology without engaging in an interaction where transmission is possible.
Funk and colleagues state that awareness may cause individuals to change their behavior
but associate no cost with this shift [41]. In reality, if awareness means taking preventive
measures to avoid infection, these actions would likely incur a cost. This cost may be
social (e.g. pressure from friends to get together rather than stay home), political (e.g.
only Democrats wear masks type sentiment), physical (e.g. masking worsens asthma), or
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economic (e.g. can’t work from home and have only one source of income). The relative cost
of taking precautions compared to the risk of infection if one doesn’t change one’s behavior
is a calculation many individuals have to make.
Often, in well-mixed models, this type of calculation can be described using game theory,
a concept introduced by economists to model rational strategic decision-making [105]. A
game is composed of two or more players with two or more possible actions. Each set of
joint actions has a set of associated payoffs for each player which summarize the cost or
benefit of that joint scenario to each individual. Based on this known set of payoffs, players
will simultaneously decide which action to take to maximize their payoff (benefit). For
example, Reluga uses a game-theoretic construct to model the adoption of social distancing
behavior in a well-mixed population during an epidemic [90]. In this implementation, social
distancing has an associated cost and is adopted if infection risk is sufficiently high [90].
Eliminating the homogeneous-mixing constraint and applying this game-theoretic approach
to a networked population is desirable but also more complicated.
One technique for applying game theory on networks is to use network influence games
[55]. In these influence games, each node (individual) has a threshold level and weighted
connections with other nodes. The node can perform one of two actions based on how it
is influenced by its neighbors and whether the neighbors’ influences are strong enough to
exceed the node’s threshold for changing its action. As far as we know, this approach has
not been used in coupled disease-behavior dynamical models to describe individual behavior
choices and social influence. As we discuss further in Chapter 4, this approach will allow
us to incorporate individual resistances to masking, perceived risks of infection, and social
pressure from neighbors into the decision-making process about behavior change during an
epidemic.

7

Chapter 2
Disease Progression
As we discussed in Chapter 1, infectious disease models can critically inform policy-making
before and during an epidemic. Here, we expand on the implementation of early infectious
disease models and map the disease compartments of our model to those used in previous
work.

2.1

Compartmental Models

Recall from Chapter 1 the classic SIR compartmental model introduced by Kermack and
McKendrick in 1927 [58]. Individuals begin in the susceptible state. Once infected they move
to the infectious state, and finally to the recovered or removed state when they are no longer
infectious (Figure 2.1). Typically, the model is seeded with some number or proportion of
initially infectious people so that there is potential for an outbreak to occur. The system
is closed (it does not account for births or deaths) so S + I + R = N where N is the total
number of individuals in the population. In its original implementation [58], this model was
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parameterized using the following ordinary differential equations:

dS/dt = −βSI
dI/dt = βSI − γI
dR/dt = γI.

Here β is the probability of disease transmission given contact and γ is the rate of recovery,
where

1
γ

is the time it takes to recover.

There are three key assumptions made in the SIR model that we reconsider in our coupled
disease-behavior dynamical model for COVID-19. First, the SIR implementation limits the
possible epidemiological states of disease. In this chapter, we further explore this assumption
and how our model grapples with it. Second, the SIR ODE model assumes homogeneous
mixing among individuals. Homogeneous mixing is captured in the SI product term as
part of both the dS/dt and dI/dt equations where all S and I individuals can come into
contact with each other. We address this assumption using contact networks in Chapter 3.
Finally, the SIR model does not allow for varied susceptibility or behavior changes among
individuals, as all the individuals in S are seen as identical. We tackle this assumption using
influence games in Chapter 4.
Below we present some illustrative and common examples of compartmental disease models to inform our work on COVID-19 disease progression.

Figure 2.1: Movement of individuals through SIR compartments.
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The differential equations describing the SIR model limit the epidemiological disease
states to three categories, excluding the possibility of reinfection or different clinical manifestations of disease. This choice of compartments is suitable for a disease in which there is
long-lasting immunity – longer at least than the time scale over which the model is being
run. For example, mumps and pertussis can both be modeled using the three SIR compartments [17, 94]. Some diseases, however, do not have long-lasting immunity. Influenza is one
example; if you make it through this year’s flu season you will likely be immune until the
following season, at which point you will be susceptible again to the circulating strain. If
one is building an influenza model spanning multiple seasons, it makes sense to use an SIRS
model, where after a recovery period individuals move back into the susceptible state and
the progression can repeat [52]. However, if there is no period of immunity, meaning that
after a period of infectiousness individuals immediately return to the susceptible state, then
an SIS model may be used. Gonorrhea is one disease to which SIS models have been applied [50]. For some diseases, there is no immunity or return to susceptibility but continuing
infectiousness. HIV/AIDS fits this description and so may be modeled using an SI model
[53].
In addition to the immunity assumption made by the SIR model, there is also the presumed instantaneous switch from susceptibility to infectiousness. An instantaneous switch
is clearly not realistic; it takes time for a virus or bacterium to replicate sufficiently to get to
levels where it is transmissible to others. The period of time from initial infection to onset of
infectiousness is called the latent period. At times, modelers may assume the latent period is
negligible, especially when it is short relative to the infectious period [4]. For some diseases,
however, it may be critical to include the latent period in a model so that the timing of
individual infectiousness is closer to reality, especially for diseases, like tuberculosis, where
the latent period is long relative to the infectious period [85]. In these cases, an SEIR model
is often used [2]. The E compartment represents Exposed individuals who become infectious
upon reaching the I compartment. Ebola is one disease to which an SEIR model has been

10

Chapter 2

Taube

applied [2]. Furthermore, just like the SIR model, the SEIR model can be extended to
represent the case when individuals return to a susceptible state after a period of recovery,
resulting in an SEIRS model [31].
Slightly different from the latent period is the incubation period of a disease, or the time
from initial infection to symptom onset [24]. If the incubation period is longer than the latent
period, then there is an interval of time when individuals are not showing symptoms but are
infectious. If the individual will never develop symptoms, then they have an asymptomatic
infection. If the individual is not yet showing symptoms but will eventually develop them,
then we consider them to be in a presymptomatic state. Asymptomatic or presymptomatic
periods can also be incorporated into compartmental disease models. For instance, measles
has been modeled using an SEAIR model [1]. In this approach the A compartment stands
for Asymptomatic, but the individuals eventually move into a symptomatic infectious state,
I, so by our definitions above we would consider A to be a presymptomatic compartment.
Sometimes this system is denoted as an SEI1 I2 R model, where I1 is a presymptomatic state
and I2 a symptomatic state; see [19] for an application to rabies. In the next section, we
discuss one way to separate the trajectories of asymptomatic and symptomatic infectious
individuals. There are many other possible compartmental progressions, and a single disease
may be modeled using multiple different progressions depending on the research question
and context [16].

2.2

Our Disease Model

To capture the progression of COVID-19 infection, we have created a compartmental disease
model inspired by SEI1 I2 R models and expanded to include truly asymptomatic individuals.
As shown in Figure 2.2, all individuals (except any seed infections) begin in the susceptible
(S) state and progress to an exposed (E) state. The E compartment acts as a time delay
between infection and the onset of infectiousness; data from China suggest that this delay is
relevant to COVID-19 infection and transmission [67]. From the exposed state, individuals
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can take one of two routes depending on whether or not their infection will ultimately be
symptomatic or remain asymptomatic. Based on data from the CDC, as of March 2021 [25],
we estimate that about 70% of infections become symptomatic, while 30% remain asymptomatic. Thus, 70% of individuals move to I1 (presymptomatic) and on to I2 (symptomatic),
where they will exhibit symptoms. The other 30% of individuals progress through the disease
via the A1 and A2 (asymptomatic) compartments. After some time, I2 and A2 individuals
will move to the removed or recovered state where they are no longer infectious.

Figure 2.2: Progression of infection and disease via symptomatic or asymptomatic routes
in our model. The E compartment is important for the time delay between infection and
infectiousness. Distinction between infectiousness states I1 , I2 , A1 and A2 allows for differentiation of infectiousness in these stages, as indicated by preliminary data [49, 27, 7].
We make this distinction in infectiousness compartments for a couple of reasons. First,
several studies [49, 27, 7] have indicated that individuals may be most infectious just before
showing symptoms or at time of symptom onset. We create I1 to allow for this possibility and differentiate I1 from A1 should the data indicate that asymptomatic infectiousness
peaks at a different time. Although currently there is a limited understanding of how the
relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals compares with that of symptomatic cases
over time, this two-compartment asymptomatic implementation provides flexibility should
further data become available. Second, individuals in I1 may behave more like susceptible
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or asymptomatic individuals if they do not know they are sick, compared to individuals in
I2 who are likely to feel unwell and reduce their contact with others. Thus, differentiating
these compartments will allow us to consider differences in behavior.
Several biological factors control the movement of individuals through these compartments. Before introducing those components of the model, though, it is important to note
that because we will be implementing this disease model on a network, we will be using
discrete time steps. With that in mind, we can begin to consider how individuals move from
one compartment to the next.
Each day, movement from S to E happens upon infection, so this process requires contact
between infectious and susceptible individuals. The parameter β describes the baseline
probability of transmission given contact between two individuals. As mentioned earlier, the
division of infectious states into four compartments allows us to instantiate the model with
different levels of transmissibility depending on stage and symptoms of infection (Figure
2.3). When we discuss our network structure in Chapter 3 and the possibility of taking
prophylactic measures in Chapter 4, we will see how these different factors further modify
the probability of transmission.

Figure 2.3: Varying probabilities of transmission given contact between infectious (orange
and red) and susceptible (blue) individuals depending on symptoms and state of infectiousness of infectious individual.
Movement from E to I1 or A1 occurs after 2 time steps (Figure 2.4) [72, 67]. This time
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is independent of whether the individual enters I1 or A1 since we have not seen evidence (to
date) to suggest that the timing would differ between asymptomatic and presymptomatic
individuals.
Individuals usually show symptoms 4 to 5 days after infection (Figure 2.4) [44, 66]. Thus,
movement from I1 to I2 occurs after 3 time steps. Movement from A1 to A2 occurs the same
way because we have not seen data suggesting otherwise.
Finally, movement from I2 to R occurs after 5 time steps (Figure 2.4) [26, 49]. The same
process is used to determine how long individuals are in the A2 compartment, as we haven’t
observed data showing that these two disease states have different infectious period lengths.

Figure 2.4: Number of time steps (days) that individuals spend in the exposed and infectious
compartments.
In total, individuals are infectious for 8 time steps (days). This timing likely aligns
with the period when cases would be most infectious, as the duration of infectiousness for
COVID-19 varies substantially across individuals and infections [20, 49]. Because they are
model parameters, these durations can easily be updated in the future to reflect the most
up-to-date knowledge. Future work may also look to draw these values from probability
distributions that reflect the variability in duration of infectiousness.
With the compartmental disease process in place, in the next section, we turn to the
contact patterns through which individuals become infected.
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Networks and Contact Structures
Human contact patterns are heterogeneous in nature. This variation demonstrably impacts
the spread of infectious diseases [104, 9, 75]. Depending on the aims of a modeling study,
including the population of interest and route of disease transmission, accounting for this
diversity in social contacts in the model can increase model accuracy [9]. In Chapter 1 we gave
a brief overview of the array of approaches modelers take to include contact heterogeneity
and established that we would be using contact networks to do so in our own model. Here,
we introduce network terminology, three standard types of networks, and the network we
build.

3.1

Networks Overview

Networks are defined as a collection of nodes and edges. Nodes represent individuals, or
groups of individuals, and are connected by edges (Figure 3.1). These edges may be directed
(i.e., have a start and endpoint) or undirected. If two nodes are connected by an edge we call
these nodes neighbors. Similarly, a sequence of nodes such that there is an edge between any
two consecutive nodes is called a path. Both nodes and edges can have assigned properties.
One fundamental node property is its degree, defined by its number of edges. If a network is
directed, then each node would have a separate in- and out-degree. An example of an edge
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property is an edge weight, assigned when the network is constructed and often designed to
represent the strength of a connection. We will see other node and edge properties when we
construct our own network disease model later in this chapter.

Figure 3.1: Example of an undirected five node network. The blue and yellow circles are
nodes, and the black lines connecting them are edges. Node 0 has a degree of 4, while nodes
1 and 4 have a degree of 3, and nodes 2 and 3 have a degree of 2.
Networks can be used to represent relationships between individuals or groups. For
instance, nodes might be scientists and edges may connect those who have co-authored a
paper [83]. Additionally, edges could be used as more active paths for information or disease
exchange. Namely, nodes might be cities and edges might be flights between those cities and
the consequent movement of passengers or cargo; Colizza et al. [30] and Hufnagel et al. [54]
both use these types of networks to model infectious diseases. Alternatively, in the context
of HIV/AIDS, nodes might represent individuals and edges might connect those that have
had sexual contact [46].
Real-world networks of human contact patterns have a few key properties. First, realworld networks are typically highly clustered [102]. Clustering can be thought of as the
chance that two nodes who have a mutual friend are also friends. For instance, if nodes A and
B are connected by an edge and nodes A and C are connected by an edge, what is the chance
that nodes B and C are connected (Figure 3.2)? If this chance is high, then the network would
be considered highly clustered, and if this chance is low, then the network has low clustering.
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Second, real-world networks typically exhibit the small-world property [102]. This property

Figure 3.2: In highly clustered networks, nodes with mutual friends (e.g., B and C) are also
likely to be connected. In networks with less clustering, nodes with mutual friends are less
likely to also be friends.
states that any node can be reached from any other node by traversing relatively few edges
(i.e., via a relatively short path). There is no strict definition of “relatively few edges,” but
the number six, as in “six degrees of separation,” has appeared in popular culture [45] as well
as sociology experiments [76]. A third, more controversial property of real-world networks
is a power law (or scale-free) degree distribution (see Figure 5.30 in Chapter 5) [18]. This
degree distribution is characterized by most nodes having a low degree, with a small number
having a very high degree. Let P(k) denote the probability of a node having degree k. Then
the power law degree distribution is defined by P(k) ∼ k −γ , where k denotes degree, γ > 1,
and a proportionality factor is required to normalize the distribution [11]. Efforts to generate
synthetic real-world networks will typically try to include these properties.
There are several standard network construction approaches that vary in how well they
represent real-world interactions; we review three relevant approaches here. One of the
simplest networks to construct is an Erdos-Renyi random graph. In this type of network,
each node is connected to every other node with some probability p between 0 and 1. The
resulting degree distribution follows a Poisson distribution: P(k) =

(N p)k e−N p
k!

where k denotes

degree and N is the total number of nodes. Erdos-Renyi networks have very little clustering
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but exhibit the small-world property. They do not accurately represent large-scale daily
human contact patterns, but they are easy to construct.
A second type of network is generated by the Watts-Strogatz model. This model begins
with nodes arranged in a circle and connected to their k (an even integer) closest neighbors
( k2 neighbors each on the right and left). Human connections are not solely spatial, though,
so Watts and Strogatz take an additional step to create a more realistic network. They use
a rewiring process, whereby for each of its k edges, with a given probability β, a node can
“choose” to remove that edge and form a new edge with another node. The initial connection
only to a node’s neighbors leads to high clustering, while the random rewiring allows these
types of networks to satisfy the small-world property. Where the Watts-Strogatz model
falls short of constructing a real-world network is its degree distribution; if the rewiring
probability β = 1, then the degree distribution follows a Poisson distribution because the
graph is identical to an Erdos-Renyi random graph. If, instead, 0 < β < 1, then the degree
distribution is approximately Poisson but has a sharp peak at degree k. This distribution
does not have the heavy tail of high-degree nodes characteristic of real-world networks.
A final network construction method of relevance is the Barabasi-Albert preferential
attachment model. This model adds nodes and edges in sequence – one node is added at
each time step. When a new node is added to the network it forms m edges, where m
is the sole model parameter. A newly added node forms an edge with an existing node i
with a probability proportional to i’s degree at that time. This probability is higher for
nodes with more edges than nodes with fewer edges. Thus, these higher degree nodes will
be more likely to grow their degree even further – hence the term preferential attachment.
The degree distribution of Barabasi-Albert networks follows a power law distribution of the
form P(k) =

2m2
.
k3

In addition to these generic networks, scientists often construct their own networks specific to the population or system that they are studying. There are numerous ways to do
this, as we touched on in Chapter 1. One common technique for disease models is to use
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multilayer networks (see Figure 3.3) where each layer represents a different type or level of
contact; e.g., household, school, work, social, and community [80, 77]. Depending on the
implementation, the same nodes may exist in each layer but have a different set of contacts
based on the context considered in that layer. For example, in [80], there are no adults in
the school layer and there are no children in the adult layer, but all individuals are present
in the household, social, and community layers. Layers may also vary in their degree distributions, levels of clustering, and small-world property adherence. Additionally, edges in
each layer can be weighted differently to reflect the higher or lower chances of transmission
in that context. While this type of network adds complexity, it allows for a more accurate
representation of the variety of contacts individuals have daily.

3.2

Our Network

We create a realistic set of contact patterns using a multilayered network. The network
consists of three layers: household, work/school, and friends. We make the simplifying
assumption that workplace interactions are analogous to those in school. As a result, we do
not incorporate age into the model. All three layers consist of the same nodes but have a
different edge generation process and different edge weights, signifying the frequency of that
type of contact (Figure 3.3). We make this distinction in edge weights because interactions
in these three arenas carry different probabilities of disease transmission. Later, in Chapter
4, we will add another set of edge weights related to social influence, but our discussion, for
now, is limited to the edge weights that, because they denote the frequency and duration of
contact, directly affect the probability of disease transmission.
At the household level, we form many separate but completely connected groups of
individuals. The complete connectedness of these groups is meant to represent that all
individuals within the same household are likely to have close contact with one another.
These group sizes are drawn from a discrete probability distribution generated from US
American Community Survey Census data from 2018 (Figure 3.4) [99]. Households can
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Figure 3.3: Multilayer network, with three layers: household, workplace, friend group. Each
layer contains the same nodes, but the connections differ between layers and are assigned
different edge weights depending on the layer.
range in size from 1 to 7 individuals, with a median of 3 individuals. Edges formed in the
household layer carry a disease weight of 1 because the chances of disease transmission in
household settings are high [74].
At the work level, we draw workplace sizes from a normal distribution centered at 20
with a standard deviation of 5. We then randomly assign nodes to workplaces. Within each
workplace, we form edges using an Erdos-Renyi process with p = 0.35. These edges carry
a disease weight of 0.7, or roughly 5/7, signifying the 5 out of 7 days a week that these
individuals may come into close enough contact for disease transmission.
At the friend level, we draw friend group sizes from a normal distribution with mean 6
and a standard deviation of 2. We then randomly assign nodes to friend groups. Within
each friend group, we form edges using an Erdos-Renyi process with p = 0.7. These edges
carry a disease weight of 0.5, estimated based on less frequent but likely longer and closer
contact than with work colleagues.
These values and distributions were chosen so that the degree distribution would be
centered around 14, a realistic estimate for daily contacts, based on work by Mossong et al.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of household sizes based on US ACS Census data from 2018. All
households with seven or more people are considered to have exactly seven people.
[79]. The workplace size distribution was loosely based on data from 2004 [59]. In the absence
of data on friend group sizes, we chose a distribution we thought was reasonable. The means
and standard deviations of these distributions, as well as the probability of edge formation
and disease transmission edge weights, are all model parameters. Thus, the sensitivity of
simulation results to these values can be tested in the future and values can be adjusted
should further data become available. Heavier tailed degree distributions should also be
experimented with in the work and friend group layers as an added element of complexity.
It is important to note that in our implementation, a pair of nodes can only be connected
once; even if two nodes are in the same household and workplace, the household interaction
“overrides” the workplace interaction given the higher edge weight. Similarly, if two nodes
are in the same household and friend group, the household interaction will override the
friend group one. Finally, because the workplace contact edge weight is higher than the
friend group contact edge weight, a workplace interaction overrides a friend group one. This
assumption simplifies the model and allows us to more accurately choose parameters that
align with the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2.
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Networks are constructed using graph-tool version 2.35 [86].

3.3

Disease Spread on Networks

Given this network, we will simulate the spread of SARS-CoV-2. We seed the outbreak
with a randomly selected node who is symptomatic infectious (I2 ), up to three of their
neighbors who are presymptomatic infectious (I1 ), and up to four of their neighbors who
are exposed (E) but will eventually become symptomatic. We seed each outbreak with the
same maximum number of infected people so that we can compare our results. As the virus
spreads, we keep track of the disease state of every node (S, E, I1 , I2 , A1 , A2 , or R) and the
length of time that they have been in that disease state so that they can progress to the
next state at the appropriate time step (discussed in Chapter 2). Disease transmission is
possible across edges between infectious (I1 , I2 , A1 , A2 ) and susceptible (S) individuals. The
daily probability of transmission between a susceptible and infectious individual is given by
β · eij , where eij is the symmetric edge weight between the two nodes. We will modify this
probability in the next chapter when we incorporate masking behavior.
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Behavior and Influence
4.1

Disease-Behavior Models

Many factors affect population disease dynamics. Contact patterns, as we reviewed in Chapter 3, are one such factor and varying behaviors are another. Behavioral effects may be a
result of individual changes in the number or types (e.g., household, work, or friend) of
contacts, in addition to increased or decreased chances of transmission when encountering
contacts. Consequently, it can be important to incorporate these behavioral aspects and
how they shift over time into a mechanistic disease model. Behavioral changes have been
built into disease models in a variety of ways that depend on whether the model assumes
homogeneous or heterogeneous contact patterns and how much individual preferences are
taken into account [106].
In homogeneous-mixing models, behavioral changes are often implemented using either
rule or economic-based methods [106]. Rule-based models use disease prevalence-based rules
that lead agents to change their behavior under certain conditions. Economic-based models
assume that individuals can calculate and attempt to maximize their personal well-being by
making behavioral changes [106]. Poletti and colleagues built a rule-based homogeneousmixing SIR model that has individuals alter their behavior when disease prevalence exceeds
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a certain level where the risk of infection is too high to justify normal behavior [87]. In contrast, Chen and colleagues used an economic-based homogeneous-mixing SIS model where
individuals determine how much time to spend outside their home interacting with others
based on the prevalence of a disease and the cost of staying home [29]. Economic-based models may also employ game-theoretic techniques which we discuss in further detail in section
4.2.
In heterogeneous-mixing models, the implementation of behavior dynamics takes several
forms depending on how the varying contact patterns are captured [106]. In Chapter 1, we
introduced the implementation by Funk and colleagues as an early example of how diseasebehavior dynamics may be modeled on networks [41]. As you will recall, the paper proposed
that awareness spreads outwards from an infected individual with decreasing quality as it gets
farther from the source. With awareness comes decreased disease susceptibility based on the
assumption that aware individuals will take preventive measures [41]. Funk and colleagues
employ multilayer networks, where disease transmission and awareness propagation layers of
the multilayer network contain the same nodes but different connections among the nodes.
Because interactions occur that cannot cause disease transmission but can affect how humans
behave with respect to a disease, distinguishing between these two types of exchange is
important. We pointed out in Chapter 1, however, that Funk and colleagues’ approach
assigns no penalty or cost for taking precautions. In reality, reducing one’s contacts, wearing
a mask, or getting a vaccination, for example, all incur some cost to the individual. While
these costs may be small relative to the benefit – a reduced chance of infection – each
individual must make this determination themselves. In our approach, detailed at the end
of this chapter, we introduce a resistance value for each node which reflects the varying cost
of masking for every individual.
Zhang and colleagues address this cost assumption in their SIR model that allows individuals to behave in one of three ways: laissez-faire, self-protective, or vaccinated [112].
Both self-protective and vaccination behaviors incur a cost that is less than that of infection.
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To represent consecutive seasonal outbreaks of a pathogen like influenza, Zhang et al. run
multiple rounds of behavior changes and infection spread. Between rounds, individuals can
decide to imitate their neighbors’ behaviors in the following season. While these behavior
updates bring this model seemingly closer to the real-world decision-making process, the updates only occur after the prior season and before the next season begins, rather than while
the disease outbreak is occurring. In consequence, the behavior update process doesn’t incorporate disease prevalence. In our model, we will incorporate the disease prevalence into
the decision-making process.
We seek to combine and refine these approaches to create a model which allows behavior
and disease dynamics to influence each other while accounting for the fact that the two
processes may happen at different rates. Furthermore, we build in the concept that changing
one’s behavior to prevent the spread of a disease can be costly and is influenced by an
individual’s neighbors’ actions. To do so, we utilize game theory and a network-specific
game-theoretic model, influence games.

4.2

Game Theory

Game theory provides a mathematical approach to modeling the rational decision-making
of individuals in situations where these decisions are interdependent. Games are composed
of players, each of whom plays an “action” based on what they expect other players to do.
Associated with each vector of joint actions is a payoff for each player. This payoff can
incorporate the costs of different actions. Players will always look to maximize their payoffs
– called playing their best response. When each player plays their best response, the system
has reached a state called Nash equilibrium [81], where no player has any incentive to change
their action. We will revisit this idea of equilibrium in our model in section 4.4.
In the meantime, an illustrative and famous example of a two person game is shown in
Figure 4.1. In this example, called Prisoner’s Dilemma, two suspects must decide whether to
confess to a crime [21]. The best outcome (highest payoff, -1) for both occurs if both do not
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confess. However, if suspect 1 considers that suspect 2 will not confess, then it is in suspect
1’s best interest to confess. Moreover, if suspect 1 considers that suspect 2 will confess,
then it is still in suspect 1’s best interest to confess. Through this set of calculations, under
both scenarios, suspect 1 will decide to confess. The same calculation applies for suspect 2
who will also decide to confess. These best responses lead to a Nash equilibrium of (confess,
confess).

Figure 4.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma two-player game theory example. Suspect 1 and 2 must
each decide whether or not to confess to a crime they committed. The payoffs – the prison
sentences – are given as Suspect 1, Suspect 2. The Nash equilibrium outcome, where both
players simultaneously play their best response and have no incentive to deviate, is shown
in blue.
Game theory has been used frequently in coupled disease-behavior models for vaccination
decision-making [14, 13, 91]. When getting a vaccine, individuals weigh several potential
costs, including the cost of infection, how expensive the vaccine is, how long it takes to get
the vaccine, and potential side effects, among others. Depending on their personal preferences
and the risks associated with the vaccine, they will decide whether or not an investment in
vaccination is advantageous for them. Interestingly, high levels of vaccination can introduce
a “free rider” effect where vaccination risks appear substantially higher than disease risks
due to the nature of herd immunity [13]. This perception may cause many people to refrain
from vaccinating. These free riders may not suffer the cost of becoming infected because
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a sufficient number of other people are vaccinated, protecting them. However, if too many
people try to take advantage of the free rider effect and choose not to vaccinate, then the
disease can continue to spread, undermining their choice of not vaccinating.
It is important to note, however, that vaccination as a behavior is somewhat different
from compliance with the other non-pharmaceutical interventions suggested or mandated to
reduce the spread of COVID-19. Once one gets a vaccine, one can’t “undo” it. Many of the
behavior models we discuss below are applied to diseases like influenza, where vaccination is
needed every year. These models allow for a yearly decision-making process after the course
of an epidemic, as in Zhang et al. [112]. However, decisions to wear masks or social distance
are happening on a different time scale. Individuals can change their decision about masking
multiple times over the course of an outbreak, whereas a vaccination decision can only be
made once during an outbreak. Thus, modeling the types of behaviors that can be changed
more frequently requires a different approach.
A variety of approaches are used to capture the human decision-making process in vaccination models. Two common approaches include imitation dynamics [39] and evolutionary
game theory. We briefly review a couple of models using these methods to demonstrate how
they have been used in the context of vaccination and may be applied to non-pharmaceutical
interventions, such as masking and social distancing.
Ndeffo et al. combine both imitation dynamics and payoff maximization to model vaccination decisions [82]. In their model, some fraction of individuals in a network update
their vaccination behaviors by imitating an immediate neighbor, and the remaining fraction
update by maximizing their perceived benefits. In the imitation process, a node i considers
the behavior of one of its randomly selected immediate neighbors j. If i and j share the
same behavior, then they stick with that choice. If their behaviors differ, then i adopts j’s
behavior with a certain probability based on if and how much higher j’s payoff is. In Ndeffo’s
model, individuals can also update behavior to maximize their individual payoff in a process
that weighs the cost of vaccination and infection, as well as the perceived probability of
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infection based on their immediate neighbors’ vaccination decisions. The update process is
continually run until a steady state is reached (i.e., individuals’ decisions no longer change
over time), at which point vaccination occurs.
In the context of our goals with this project, an overall strength of this methodology is
how it allows decisions to fluctuate and eventually converge to an equilibrium. A weakness is
that imitation behavior is considered mutually exclusive to payoff-driven behavior. In other
words, in Ndeffo’s model, an individual does not take into account both the social influence
of their neighbors and what their neighbors’ decisions mean for their chances of infection.
Furthermore, node i considers only the actions of a single neighbor in their decision-making
process, rather than all or most of their neighbors. Imitating only a single random neighbor,
instead of taking into account the behaviors of multiple neighbors, doesn’t realistically represent the human decision-making process. Fukuda and colleagues [40] adjust this assumption
by modifying the probability that i imitates j. In Fukuda’s model node i still picks a random
neighbor j, but instead of looking at only j’s payoff, i calculates the average payoff of any
individual adopting the same behavior as j. The average payoff is then used to determine
whether to adopt the same behavior as j. This implementation reflects that a node i is likely
basing their behavior decision off of the behavior of more than one other individual.
An alternative process is used by Xia and colleagues [111] to better capture social influence. Individuals use a combination of game-theoretical cost minimization calculations and
the influence of neighbors to determine their vaccination decision. The cost minimization
calculation is similar to those discussed earlier and involves the weighing of infection and
vaccination costs. The social influence computation includes the strength of a connection,
the behavior of a neighbor, and the number of neighbors accepting and rejecting vaccination. Individuals are then assigned a probability p that indicates their tendency to adopt the
cost-minimizing behavior. With probability 1 − p they instead adopt the behavior suggested
by the social influence calculations. If both calculations point to the same decision, then
this probability is irrelevant. Xia and colleagues’ approach is closest to the one we consider
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in our model of human behavior. Like Xia et al., our decision-making model weighs both
social influence and cost minimization. We use a construct called influence games, discussed
in the next section, to calculate social influence.

4.3

Influence Games

Before we introduce influence games, it will be helpful to understand the linear threshold
model [57]. The linear threshold model is defined as follows. In a network, a node i is
P
influenced by each neighbor j with a weight wji ≥ 0 such that j wji ≤ 1. Each node i
also has a threshold, or resistance, qi ∈ [0, 1]. This threshold defines the weighted fraction
of i’s neighbors which must be “active” for i to choose to become “active”. Otherwise, i
will remain “inactive”. Initially, all but a small set of nodes are inactive. Then the diffusion
process begins: the active nodes can influence their neighbors to adopt an active state, who
can influence their neighbors to adopt an active state, and so on. The diffusion proceeds
until either all nodes are active or nodes are no longer changing their behavior. This idea
of activity could be applied in many contexts, e.g. for i to choose to be vaccinated or to
choose to mask. In the linear threshold model, due to non-negative influence weights, if a
node becomes active at any point it remains in that state throughout the duration of the
model. When thinking about vaccination, this continued activation may be acceptable, but
in the context of behaviors like masking which can be “undone”, we would like a model that
allows for more switching of behaviors.
In 2014, Irfan and Ortiz [55] introduced linear influence games as a game-theoretic method
to model the behavior of a finite-networked population. They focus specifically on stable
outcomes. Similar to the linear threshold model [57], this approach begins with a directed
network composed of nodes with varying threshold, or resistance, levels, qi ∈ R. Edges
carry influence weights, wji ∈ R which reflect the amount of influence that a node j exerts
on a neighbor i. These directed edges are not necessarily symmetric: a node i may exert
more influence on a node j than j exerts on i. Each node in the network adopts one of
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two behaviors, denoted by the integers −1 and 1. If there is no influence, a node with a
positive threshold will adopt behavior −1 while a node with a negative threshold will adopt
behavior +1 (see equation 4.1 below). A node i determines their incoming influence from all
neighbors j using the following expression:
X

xj · wji .

j6=i

Comparing the value of this expression with their individual threshold qi , a node will decide
whether or not to change their behavior to maximize their payoff:

i0 s payoff = xi

X


xj · wji − qi .

(4.1)

j6=i

This payoff calculation takes into account the actions of other players.
Equation 4.1 determines how i chooses whether their behavior xi is −1 or 1; this is i’s
best response. If
X

xj wji − qi < 0,

(4.2)

j6=i

then it is in i’s best interest to perform behavior xi = −1 so that

xi

X


xj wji − qi > 0,

j6=i

maximizing i’s payoff. One scenario in which equation 4.2 holds is when the total influence
on i is 0 and i has a positive threshold. Alternatively, if
X

xj wji − qi > 0,

(4.3)

j6=i

then i chooses xi = 1 so that i’s payoff is largest. One scenario in which equation 4.3 holds
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is if there is no net influence on i and i has a negative threshold. In the case where
X

xj wji − qi = 0,

j6=i

i will choose either action with equal probability. At each time step, each node sums the
incoming influences to determine the action to perform at the next time step to maximize
their payoff. Unlike the linear threshold model, this influence game model allows nodes to
switch their behaviors back and forth. It is with this model in mind that we detail how
individuals decide which preventive behaviors to take in our implementation.

4.4

Our Behavior Model

Given the disease progression and contact structure we established in Chapters 2 and 3, we
can now construct the behavioral model. We focus specifically on masking behavior. Using an
influence game approach, we will consider three components of individuals’ decision process
about masking: resistance, risk, and influence.
Individuals naturally have some level of resistance to masking. The monetary or temporal
cost of finding or buying masks and the physical discomfort or political consequences of
wearing a mask likely contribute to this resistance. An individual’s baseline willingness to
mask is then represented by q̃i ∈ [0, L], where L indicates a strong unwillingness to mask and
0 indicates no resistance to masking. We experiment with the scaling factor L in Chapter
5 to find an appropriate range of resistance relative to the remaining components of the
behavior calculation. At model initialization, each individual, i, will be assigned q̃i drawn
from a uniform distribution U(0, L). One consequence of this resistance structure is that
individuals will choose not to mask in the absence of disease and social influence.
The second component of an individual’s decision calculation is their perceived risk of
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infection. One way to quantify risk is:

risk of an event = cost of that event · probability of that event.

To calculate the perceived risk of infection for node i, ρi , we take the product of the perceived
cost of infection, ci , and the perceived probability of infection. We reason that an individual’s
perceived probability of infection is the proportion of their neighbors who are infectious. This
construction assumes some level of baseline testing so that a node knows how many of their
neighbors are infectious, even if presymptomatic or asymptomatic. Let Ui represent the set
of node i’s neighbors. Then (A1 ∪ A2 ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ) ∩ Ui gives the set of all infectious neighbors
of i and the perceived risk of infection is given by:
s
|(A1 ∪ A2 ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ) ∩ Ui |
ρ i = ci ·
|Ui |
where |.| denotes cardinality. Infection costs, ci , are drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1)
and assigned to each individual at model initialization. These costs are meant to represent
how important it is to an individual that they do not become infected. For example, older and
immunocompromised individuals may have larger perceived costs of COVID-19 infection, as
may people aware of the possible long-hauler effects of COVID-19 infection [5, 22, 98].
Both terms in this risk calculation fall between 0 and 1, meaning that their product is
sublinear. Social influence, which we discuss next, is constructed linearly. Thus, we take
the square root of the product so that the perceived risk of infection is comparable to social
influence.
Following the linear threshold model of Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [57], as well as
Irfan and Ortiz’s influence game model [55], we define the social influence on each node i to
be:
X

xj wji ,

(4.4)

j∈Ui

where, as above, Ui is the neighborhood of node i. The behavior of node j is encoded
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by xj ∈ {−1, 1} where −1 indicates not masking and 1 indicates masking. The weight,
or influence, of node j’s actions on node i is denoted by wji ∈ [0, 1] with larger weights
denoting stronger influence. The incoming weights, wji , to node i are determined as follows.
0
First, preliminary weights, wji
, are drawn from U(0, 1). A maximum influence sum, φi ,
0
is also drawn from U(0, 1). The preliminary weights, wji
, are then normalized so that
P
j∈Ui wji = φi . This process ensures that the total social influence on node i, given by

equation 4.4, lies in [−φi , φi ] ⊂ [−1, 1], and at the same time creates random heterogeneity in
the power of social influence on individual decision-making across the network. In Chapter 5,
we explore the impact of the strength of influence on coupled disease and behavior dynamics
by reducing the domain of the uniform distribution from which φi is drawn.
Bringing these three decision components together, node i will make a decision for the
following time step by evaluating
s
Di =

ci ·

|(A1 ∪ A2 ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ) ∩ Ui | X
+
xj wji − q̃i .
|Ui |
j∈U

(4.5)

i

If Di > 0, then i will adopt masking behavior at the next time step. If Di < 0, then i will
not adopt masking behavior at the next time step. If Di = 0, then i chooses either behavior
with equal probability.
Equation 4.5 is the behavioral model without equilibration. However, this implementation can lead nodes to frequently (and unrealistically) switch their masking behavior back
and forth as a result of incoming influences. To address this issue, we allow the behavior
process to equilibrate at each time step: nodes go through an iterative process of deciding
their masking behavior based on the choices of their neighbors until they no longer want to
change their decision. When the system has reached equilibrium, nodes are playing their
best response, and the chosen behaviors are considered a Nash equilibrium at that time step.
This equilibration process happens between rounds of disease spread on the network. Thus,
behavioral decisions can change more frequently than infection can spread in our model, as
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in real life [56]. In Chapter 5, we explore the impact of this equilibration assumption by
comparing model output with full equilibration, partial equilibration, and no equilibration.
With our complete coupled disease-behavior dynamical model in place, we can now turn
to simulating outbreaks and examining the effect of these different elements of decisionmaking on outbreak dynamics.
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We can now explore the interplay of mechanisms governing the behavior and disease dynamics
of SARS-CoV-2.

5.1

Parameters

We use several parameters in our simulations (Table 5.1). At this stage, in choosing these
parameters, we look to create a reasonably realistic infection process from which to deduce
qualitative insights about the interactions among the disease and behavior mechanisms. If
this model were to be used to predict case counts or other COVID-19 statistics, parameter
choice, sensitivity, and uncertainty quantification would be critically important.
Recall that β represents the probability of transmission given contact between an infectious and a susceptible individual. In our model, this baseline β neither accounts for the
intensity of contact (as represented by household, work, or friend edge weights in our multilayer network) nor how masking of either individual may reduce the chances of transmission.
In reality, β is very difficult to estimate. We come up with some plausible values listed in
Table 5.1 based on current data. Researchers estimate the average number of secondary
SARS-CoV-2 infections caused by an infectious individual in a fully susceptible population
to be 2.5 [25]. On average, each infectious node in our network will have a degree around
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13 or 14 and be infectious for 8 days. To infect 2.5 of their susceptible neighbors in this
time period, the probability of transmission given contact must be around 0.024. Given that
asymptomatic individuals are thought to be 75% as infectious as symptomatic individuals
[25], we chose the β values below.
Table 5.1: Parameter list.

1

Parameter

Value

βpre−A (for individuals in A1 )

0.02

βpre (for individuals in I1 )

0.02

βA (for individuals in A2 )

0.02

β (for individuals in I2 )

0.033

Probability of developing symptoms

0.7

Time in E

2 time steps

Time in I1 or A1

3 time steps

Time in I2 or A2

5 time steps

Reduced chance of transmission if infectious person masks

0.3

Reduced chance of transmission if susceptible person masks

0.8

Workplace size

Normal(20,5)

Workplace edge probability

0.35

Workplace disease edge weight

0.7

Friend group size

Normal(6,2)

Friend group edge probability

0.7

Friend disease edge weight

0.5

Resistance scaling factor1 , L

0.2

Model results for different values of L are shown in Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12

36

Chapter 5

5.2

Taube

Network Characteristics

We use several different networks in our simulations. First, we use the multilayer network
structure outlined in Chapter 3. This contact structure differentiates between household,
work, and friend interactions when running the infection process. In the following experiments, we use four different one thousand node multilayer networks, with the degree distribution of each shown in Figure 5.1. As expected given the Erdos-Renyi process used to
connect individuals in the work and friend layers, the degree distribution looks Poisson, centered around a degree of 13 or 14. Future work could vary these distributions further so that
the degree distribution has a heavier right tail, reflecting the few individuals who have an
unusually high number of contacts. This exploration would also be important if we wanted
to incorporate the possibility of superspreading into our model [68].

Figure 5.1: Degree distributions of four networks of one thousand nodes generated using the
multilayer method outlined in Chapter 3. (A) network 1, (B) network 2, (C) network 3, (D)
network 4.
Second, to compare different contact structures we generate two Erdos-Renyi random
networks and two Barabasi-Albert preferential attachment networks of one thousand nodes
each. You will recall that the degree distribution of Erdos-Renyi random networks approaches
a Poisson distribution as the number of nodes approaches infinity, and we observe a similar degree distribution in our networks of 1000 nodes (Figure 5.2). The Barabasi-Albert
preferential attachment networks have a power law degree distribution (Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.2: Degree distribution of Erdos-Renyi random networks of one thousand nodes
generated with p = 0.014. (A) Erdos-Renyi network 1, (B) Erdos-Renyi network 2.

Figure 5.3: Degree distribution of Barabasi-Albert preferential attachment network of one
thousand nodes generated with m = 7. (A) Barbasi-Albert network 1, (B) Barbasi-Albert
network 2.
While the degree distribution of the Erdos-Renyi networks is not all that different from
our multilayer network, the edge weights are modified. In the multilayer network, the disease
edge weights are based on whether two nodes are in the same household, workplace, or friend
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group. In the Erdos-Renyi network, all disease edge weights are 0.71, a weighted average of
the household, work, and friend edge weights from the multilayer network. This edge weight
is also used in the generated Barbasi-Albert preferential attachment networks.
With these networks in mind, we can now turn to the disease and behavior simulations.

5.3

Model Simulations

To simulate a disease outbreak we initialize the model in the following way. First, we
construct the contact network, as detailed above and in Chapter 3. Then, we seed a single
node at random and this node will serve as the seed for every outbreak simulation on this
network. The seed is symptomatic and infectious (I2 ). If behavior is part of the model, the
seed is also masking. Three neighbors of the seed are presymptomatic infectious (I1 ) and
masking, while four different neighbors are exposed (E) and will become symptomatic. These
exposed neighbors are not masking at the start of the simulation. This initialization assumes
that the seed infects at least seven others, which is somewhat high. However, superspreading
events play a role in the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2, so this assumption is not
unrealistic [3].
The chance of infection of an individual is based on the disease state of the infectious
node, whether or not both nodes are masking, and the strength of the interaction between
them:
P(transmission from i −→ j) = βi · eij · mi · mj .
Here, βi is the β value associated with the infectious individual’s infectious state (I1 , I2 , A1 , or
A2 ) and eij is the disease edge weight between individual i and j (based on household, work,
or friend interaction). The mi and mj terms represent the reduced probability of transmission
if the infectious or susceptible individuals mask, respectively. If the infectious node masks,
the probability of transmission is reduced by 70%, meaning mi = 0.3. Otherwise, mi = 1.
If the susceptible node masks the probability of transmission is reduced by 20%, meaning
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mj = 0.8. Otherwise, mj = 1.
All analyses were conducted in R version 4.0.3 and all code will be available on GitHub
at http://github.com/jtaube/taube-bowdoin-honors.

5.3.1

No Masking Behavior

We first simulate disease propagation across our multilayer network without any masking
behavior. These simulations serve as a baseline to which we can compare outcomes of
simulations that allow masking and also verify that our network disease model is functioning
properly. As expected, the number of newly infected individuals rises and falls as the disease
spreads throughout the network (Figure 5.4). Across networks, the total number of infected
individuals ranged from 660 to almost 780 (Figure 5.5A). The peak number of daily new
infections per outbreak generally fluctuated between 20 and 27 new infections (Figure 5.5B),
while the median time at which the outbreak peaked varied between 40 and 55 time steps
(Figure 5.5C). All values were relatively consistent across networks.

5.3.2

Mask Mandate

In contrast, we can look at the results of disease outbreaks in populations 85% compliant
with mask mandates (850 people in our 1000 node networks). In this case, the seeded infected
nodes must also be compliant with the mask mandate. With a mask mandate in place, the
total number of infected people rarely exceeds 30, compared to over 650 infections when
no one masked (Figure 5.6A). In Figure 5.6B, we see that the daily peak number of new
infections is typically only 1 or 2. The timing of these peaks is also much earlier than the
outbreaks without masking (Figure 5.6C), with network medians all less than 10 time steps.
Ultimately, masking reduces infections in our model, shifting the peak outbreak time earlier.
Outbreaks without masking and with mask mandates lie at the two extremes of reality.
We are really interested in the region in between: when people can choose whether to mask,
how many will do so? Based on what factors?
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Figure 5.4: No masking behavior. Number of newly infected nodes per time step for four
one thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red
line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95%
confidence interval.

Figure 5.5: No masking behavior. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network. (A) Total
number of nodes infected. (B) Peak number of daily new infections. (C) Time step of peak
number of daily new infections.
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Figure 5.6: Mask mandate with 85% compliance. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer
network. (A) Total number of nodes infected. (B) Peak number of daily new infections. (C)
Time step of peak number of daily new infections.

5.3.3

Role of Resistance

To address these questions, we begin by looking at our behavior model without resistance
(q˜i = 0 for everyone). In other words, individuals’ decisions about masking are solely based
on their neighborhood risk and social influence. One concern in a model without masking
resistance is that people may continue to mask even when there is no risk of infection. For
example, if everyone is masking and disease risk is eliminated, social influence will continue
to encourage masking. This behavior would not be realistic. We will see later in section
5.3.5 why this doesn’t happen, but this possibility initially motivated our use of resistance
in the model.
In Figure 5.7, we see that in the absence of resistance, the number of people masking
dramatically dominates the number of people infected. Further, the peak of the average
masking curve (in blue) roughly aligns with the peak of the average infection curve (in red).
No more than around 200 people mask on a given day (Figure 5.7) and rarely do more than
330 total different people mask (Figure 5.8A). Fewer total maskers leads to more infections
than in the mask mandate model (Figure 5.8B), though still nearly 100 fewer infections
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Figure 5.7: No resistance to masking; only perceived risk and social influence contribute to
masking decision. Number of newly infected nodes per time step for four one thousand node
multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average
daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence interval.
Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region shows
the 95% confidence interval.
than outbreaks without masking. Peak daily cases and time also fall in between the mask
mandate and no masking models, though closer to the no masking simulation runs (Figure
5.8 C, D).
When we include resistance to masking in the model, we must consider its scale – or
importance – relative to social influence and perceived risk. Since we have no data quantifying
resistance to masking, it’s even more important to use the model to explore the potential
interplay between resistance and our other factors impacting behavior. The relative scale
of resistance is represented by the factor L, where larger values of L indicate higher levels
of resistance relative to risk and social influence. If resistance is too high, it can overpower
social influence and perceived risk so that no one masks. To explore an appropriate scale of
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nodes who masked at some point during the
(C) Peak number of daily new infections.
infections.
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perceived risk and social influence contribute
each multilayer network. (A) Total number of
outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected.
(D) Time step of peak number of daily new

resistance we run the equilibrating behavior model with L values of 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8,
and 1. The results of L values of 0.01, 0.1, and 0.2 are shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.11 and
the results of L values of 0.4, 0.8, and 1 are shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.12.
With increasing resistance, the total and daily number of masking individuals decreases
substantially. Median total maskers is over 300 for all four networks when maximum resistance is 0.01 but below 100 when maximum resistance is 1 (Figures 5.11 A, 5.12 A). Trends
in total number of infected individuals, peak cases, and peak times are less notable across
the resistance levels aside from the increased number of infections when fewer individuals
mask. We feel that any maximum resistance between 0.1 and 0.4 is reasonable, as these L
values don’t completely prevent masking but are large enough to compete with influence and
risk terms. We will be using 0.2 as the maximum resistance in the remaining experiments.
As a baseline, Figure 5.13 shows again the 10 simulations on each multilayer network
with the behavior model using maximum resistance of 0.2. The summary outbreak statistics
are shown in Figure 5.14.
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Figure 5.9: Varying maximum resistance to masking. Number of newly infected nodes per
time step for four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each column is a maximum
resistance level, 0.01, 0.1, and 0.2, from left to right. Each row is a network; network 1, 2,
3, and 4 from top to bottom. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows
average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence
interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region
shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5.10: Varying maximum resistance to masking. Number of newly infected nodes
per time step for four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each column is a maximum
resistance level, 0.4, 0.8, and 1, from left to right. Each row is a network; network 1, 2, 3,
and 4 from top to bottom. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows
average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence
interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region
shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5.11: Varying maximum resistance to masking. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer
network. Each column is a maximum resistance level, 0.01, 0.1, and 0.2, from left to right.
Each row is a statistic. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the
outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections.
(D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.
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Figure 5.12: Varying maximum resistance to masking. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer
network. Each column is a maximum resistance level, 0.4, 0.8, and 1, from left to right. Each
row is a statistic. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak.
(B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections. (D) Time
step of peak number of daily new infections.
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Figure 5.13: Maximum resistance of 0.2. Number of newly infected nodes per time step for
four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark
red line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95%
confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light
blue region shows the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.14: Maximum resistance of 0.2. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network.
(A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak. (B) Total number
of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections. (D) Time step of peak number
of daily new infections.
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Role of Perceived Risk

Fear is thought to be a large driver of precautionary behavior, especially in the context
of COVID-19 [36, 48]. We further investigate the role of perceived risk in our model by
eliminating it all together. Will anyone mask if no one perceives any risk of disease and
everyone follows what their neighbors are doing? The way we’ve initialized our model with
only a few maskers in a network of one thousand, early on there is overwhelming social
influence not to mask. Thus, in the absence of perceived risk no one masks and we observe
an epidemic curve as we saw when we modeled disease without behavior (Figures 5.15 and
5.16). The four maskers in Figure 5.16A are those that were initialized as masking in the
model. Evidently, risk is the main driver of masking behavior in our model.

Figure 5.15: No perceived risk of infection; only resistance (up to 0.2) and social influence
contribute to masking decision. Number of newly infected nodes per time step for four one
thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red
line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95%
confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes.
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Figure 5.16: No perceived risk of infection; only resistance (up to 0.2) and social influence
contribute to masking decision. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network. (A) Total
number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes
infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections. (D) Time step of peak number of daily
new infections.
In our calculation of perceived risk, we don’t account for how masked neighbors may
reduce a node’s risk of infection. If we include neighbor masking behavior in the risk calculation, we may see some kind of free rider effect where a node with many masking neighbors
perceives that they are at lower risk of infection and, thus, they are less inclined to mask.
We test this idea by scaling perceived risk by the proportion of masking neighbors. Let the
set Ui contain all of i’s neighbors and the set M contain all masking individuals. If 0.7 is
the reduction in the probability of transmission from the infectious individual masking, then
the new term in our risk product is

1 − 0.7

|M ∩ Ui |
|Ui |

(5.1)

where |.| denotes cardinality. We include the 0.7 scalar in this expression to highlight that
masking does not completely eliminate the risk of transmission. When we incorporate expression 5.1 into our perceived risk formula we have
s
ρi =

|(A1 ∪ A2 ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ) ∩ Ui | 
|M ∩ Ui | 
ci ·
· 1 − 0.7
.
|Ui |
|Ui |
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In equation 5.2, we can see that fewer masking neighbors lead to larger values of expression
5.1 and, consequently, larger perceived risks of infection, whereas more masking neighbors
reduce perceived risk.
When we implement this model, we see levels of masking similar to that seen in the
original behavior model (Figures 5.17 and 5.18).

Figure 5.17: Perceived risk incorporating proportion of masking neighbors. Number of newly
infected nodes per time step for four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10
simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average daily number of newly infected
nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average
daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region shows the 95% confidence interval.
The median total number of maskers ranged from 230 to 255 in the original behavior
model, and with this new risk structure the median total number of maskers vary from
220 to 255, with the lowest occurring in network 4. Likewise, the median total number of
infections appear to be about the same or a bit lower with this new risk structure than
in the original behavior model. Scaling perceived risk by neighbors’ masking decisions did
not produce the free rider effect we had expected, nor did this risk structure change the
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Figure 5.18: Perceived risk incorporating proportion of masking neighbors. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point
during the outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new
infections. (D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.
overall masking and disease dynamics. This result indicates the robustness of our original
risk formulation, though additional testing for the free rider effect when masking is initially
more widespread is necessary.

5.3.5

Role of Social Influence

We also run the equilibrating model without social influence to see how individuals behave
when only considering disease risk and masking resistance. When social influence isn’t
present, the number of total maskers in each outbreak ranges from under 200 to over 800,
compared to between 220 and 270 total maskers in the original behavior model (Figure 5.20D
vs. 5.14D). The large number of maskers drives down the total number of cases, the peak
new cases per day, and often the peak day of the outbreak (Figure 5.20). Number of maskers
per day increases initially as people have a chance to respond to the seed infections in their
neighborhood, and then, on average, declines toward zero as the outbreak wanes (Figure
5.19).
This average seems to be obscuring a lot of the variation across simulations. In Figure
5.21 we look more closely at how the number of people masking each day fluctuates over the
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Figure 5.19: No social influence; only resistance (up to 0.2) and perceived risk contribute to
masking decision. Number of newly infected nodes per time step for four one thousand node
multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average
daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence interval.
Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region shows
the 95% confidence interval.
course of the outbreak across ten simulations on multilayer network 1. We observe multiple
waves of increasing maskers per day in the light purple, blue, and green curves. These
trends contrast with what we have seen in our model that includes social influence, where
the number of daily maskers curves typically have a single peak. The rise and fall of masking
observed in the absence of social influence aligns more with what we had expected to see, in
that as infections increase, masking increases, then infections fall, and masking falls, and so
on. These results demonstrate how much social influence is preventing people from masking
and stabilizing masking behavior in our model. The lack of stability without social influence
may be unsurprising given that when we eliminate social influence, there is no longer an
equilibration process. In the original behavior model, the only factor changing during the
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Figure 5.20: No social influence; only resistance (up to 0.2) and perceived risk contribute to
masking decision. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network. (A) Peak number of daily
new infections. (B) Time step of peak number of daily new infections. (C) Total number of
nodes infected. (D) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak.

Figure 5.21: No social influence; only resistance (up to 0.2) and perceived risk contribute
to masking decision. Number of masking nodes per day shown for 10 different simulations
on multilayer network 1 (1000 nodes). Each simulation is a different color. Note that the
light purple, blue, and green curves appear to have multiple waves of increased number of
maskers per day.
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equilibration process was the behavior of one’s neighbors – neither masking resistance nor
perceived risk changed. Thus, removing social influence means no equilibration occurs in
the decision-making process. We will further explore the role of equilibration in the next
section, but first, we look at the relative importance of risk and social influence.
Risk will always push people to mask, while resistance will always prevent people from
masking. Social influence can go both ways but in our model appears to mostly act against
masking behavior. Factors against masking (resistance and perhaps influence) are often
outweighing factors encouraging masking (risk and perhaps influence) in our original model.
We must consider that risk and social influence may not equally contribute to the decision
whether to mask.
To explore this possibility, we experiment with maximum incoming influence values. In
our original behavior model, the sum of incoming influence weights, φ, was uniformly drawn
from [0,1]. Here we test φ values drawn uniformly from [0, 0.1], [0, 0.25], [0, 0.5], and [0,
0.75], in addition to [0, 1]. With incoming influences drawn from [0, 0.1], [0, 0.25], or [0, 0.5],
the masking dynamics appear very similar to the model without social influence: on average,
the number of masking individuals rises quickly at the beginning of the outbreak and then
decreases more slowly back to zero (Figures 5.22 and 5.23). With φ values drawn from [0,
0.75] we begin to see the tension between social influence and perceived risk. The average
peak of the number of maskers per day curve is highest, likely because social influence is
strong enough to synchronize behavior changes and reduce variability but cannot completely
dominate perceived risk which increases the number of maskers. It also appears that, on
average, the number of daily maskers rises for a longer period of time and then decreases
more quickly when φ can range up to 0.75 versus lower maximum φ values. In the future,
we would like to explore the sensitivity of the model to the range of φ and look to quantify
this tension between perceived risk and social influence.
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Figure 5.22: Varying maximum incoming social influence. Each column is a maximum
influence level, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1, from left to right. Each row is a network; network
1, 2, 3, and 4 from top to bottom. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red
line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95%
confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light
blue region shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5.23: Varying maximum incoming social influence. Outbreak statistics for each multilayer network. Each column is a maximum influence level, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1, from
left to right. Each row is a statistic. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point
during the outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new
infections. (D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.
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Role of Equilibration

Equilibration plays a key role in the behavior dynamics that we observe, as previewed when
we removed social influence. Without equilibration, the range of total maskers spans from
under 400 to nearly 1000 (the whole network) (Figure 5.25). Due to the greater levels of
masking in the non-equilibrating model, the total number of nodes infected and the peak
daily cases tend to be lower, and the peak time earlier (Figure 5.25). We can also see in Figure
5.24 how the number of maskers on a given day rises and falls quickly. This phenomenon
is likely a result of the switching back and forth that can occur due to social influence on
a node being positive in one step and negative the next. The disease is spreading at the
same rate as masking decisions are being made, so that may also add variability to masking
decisions over time. On the other hand, if we let the behavioral system reach equilibrium
without changing the perceived risk during the decision process, we eliminate the switching.
Individuals are more forward-looking as they speculate on what others may do and determine
the best decision for themselves.
Equilibration often only requires three (or sometimes just two) rounds. What happens
if equilibration is always limited to two rounds? In Figures 5.26 and 5.27 we explore this
question. Immediately, we can see how with only two rounds of equilibration (only one
more than in the no equilibration scenario) we have eliminated the dramatic increases and
decreases in number of daily maskers seen without equilbration. In fact, the dynamics and
summary statistics aren’t all that different from our full equilibration model. These results
suggest that two rounds of equilibration are all that is necessary to limit large oscillations
in masking behavior.

5.3.7

Role of Network Structure

Next, we will explore the role that our multilayer network structure may have had on the
disease-behavior dynamics of our system. Let us first look at the two Erdos-Renyi random

59

Chapter 5

Taube

Figure 5.24: No equilibration in the decision-making process. Number of newly infected
nodes per time step for four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10 simulations
is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and
pink region shows the 95% confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number
of masking nodes, and light blue region shows the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.25: No equilibration in the decision-making process. Outbreak statistics for each
multilayer network. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the
outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections.
(D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.

60

Chapter 5

Taube

Figure 5.26: Two rounds of equilibration in the decision-making process. Number of newly
infected nodes per time step for four one thousand node multilayer networks. Each of 10
simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average daily number of newly infected
nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence interval. Dark blue line shows average
daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region shows the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.27: Two rounds of equilibration in the decision-making process. Outbreak statistics
for each multilayer network. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during
the outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections.
(D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.
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networks on which we ran the equilibrating behavior model with maximum resistance L = 0.2
(Figure 5.28). Recall that these networks are constructed with a constant probability of an
edge between any two nodes, in our case p = 0.014. Comparing the Erdos-Renyi networks
with our multilayer networks, we see slightly shorter peak times, slightly higher totals for
infected individuals and peak cases, and roughly the same total number of maskers (Figure
5.29). The shorter peak times and higher number of people infected may be explained by
Erdos-Renyi’s adherence to the small-world property. Lower clustering of the Erdos-Renyi
network compared to the multilayer network would allow the disease to spread more quickly
and reach more individuals [35].

Figure 5.28: Number of newly infected nodes per time step for two one thousand node
Erdos-Renyi random networks. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows
average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence
interval. Dark blue line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region
shows the 95% confidence interval.
The Barabasi-Albert preferential attachment networks had very different degree distributions than our multilayer network. The power law degree distribution means that a few
nodes have very high degrees (sometimes called hubs), while most nodes have lower degrees.
In this experiment, we use two different Barabasi-Albert networks. Initially, we seed each at
random and then run the outbreak. We then repeat the experiment by instead seeding the
highest degree node in the network (> 100 neighbors in these cases). Finally, we seed one of
the nodes of lower degree (specifically, degree 7). Interestingly, the results aren’t that differ62
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Figure 5.29: Outbreak statistics for two one thousand node Erdos-Renyi random networks.
(A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak. (B) Total number
of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections. (D) Time step of peak number
of daily new infections.
ent regardless of which way we seed the outbreak (Figure 5.30). Across all four simulations,
we see a peak of roughly 300 daily maskers that is a few time steps delayed from the daily
new infections peak. Based on Figure 5.31A, it appears that total number of maskers is tied
more to the network structure than how the outbreak is seeded. The total number of infected
individuals and the peak number of daily cases do not vary noticeably across the different
types of seeds (Figure 5.31). The place where seed choice matters most is in the peak outbreak time, where the outbreaks seeded with lower degree nodes took noticeably longer to
reach their peak compared to the outbreaks seeded randomly or with highest degree nodes
(Figure 5.31D). The hub structure of Barabasi-Albert networks facilitates faster spreading
of the disease than seen in our multilayer networks (Figure 5.31D). However, it still takes
some time for the disease to spread from a low degree seed to higher degree nodes that can
propagate the disease more rapidly, hence the delayed peak time when seeding the outbreak
in lower degree nodes. Disease outbreaks on the Barabasi-Albert networks had higher peak
cases, total infections, and total number of maskers than on the multilayer networks (Figure
5.31).
In sum, these different networks demonstrate how important contact structure is to behavior and disease dynamics.
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Figure 5.30: Number of newly infected nodes per time step for two one thousand node
Barabasi-Albert preferential attachment networks. Columns are seeded differently; randomly, highest degree node, lower degree node, from left to right. Each row is a different
network. Each of 10 simulations is shown in grey. Dark red line shows average daily number of newly infected nodes, and pink region shows the 95% confidence interval. Dark blue
line shows average daily number of masking nodes, and light blue region shows the 95%
confidence interval.

Figure 5.31: Outbreak statistics for each Barabasi-Albert preferential attachment network.
Networks are either seeded randomly, with the highest degree node, or with a lower degree
node. (A) Total number of nodes who masked at some point during the outbreak. (B) Total
number of nodes infected. (C) Peak number of daily new infections. (D) Time step of peak
number of daily new infections.
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6.1

Key Findings

We built a coupled disease-behavior dynamical model for SARS-CoV-2 using contact networks and drawing from influence games. Individuals are connected within households,
workplaces, and friend groups with different interaction strengths, representing the amount
of physical contact or duration of time spent together. We based decisions about masking
on three factors: individual resistance to masking; perceived risk of infection, based on the
proportion of infectious neighbors and personal cost of infection; and social influence from
immediate neighbors.
We found that social influence largely prevented masking behavior, whereas risk motivated masking behavior. We used the model to estimate a scale for resistance to masking
at which resistance balanced risk in the absence of social influence but played a smaller role
when both risk and influence were part of the decision calculation. Equilibration prevented
extreme swings in behavior, impacting both masking dynamics and total number of maskers.
Moreover, only two rounds of equilibration were necessary to reduce these oscillations. Network structure was also key to masking and disease dynamics: Barabasi-Albert preferential
attachment networks had more total maskers and total infected individuals, in addition to
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higher peak numbers of daily new infections but substantially lower time until outbreak
peak. We can explain these differences by the core-periphery structure of Barabasi-Albert
networks. When giving individuals the choice to mask, we rarely saw more than one-third
of the network masking at one time, in stark contrast to the mask mandate with 85% compliance that we used as a comparison to outbreaks without masking. These results are
summarized in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: Summary of results. Ten simulations conducted on multilayer network 1 with
1000 nodes with varying behavior models. Note that Barabasi-Albert and Erdos-Renyi
simulations were conducted on the respective networks. (A) Total number of nodes who
masked at some point during the outbreak. (B) Total number of nodes infected. (C) Peak
number of daily new infections. (D) Time step of peak number of daily new infections.
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Future Work

We have just scratched the surface in the construction of this coupled disease-behavior dynamical model and there are many possibilities for where we could go next. One option
would be to include other non-pharmaceutical intervention behaviors, such as social distancing, quarantine, and isolation. We could take advantage of the option to use dynamic
networks to temporarily reduce and restore contacts by removing and creating edges.
Additionally, we could incorporate the perception of global risk of disease into the model.
This could be done based on overall disease prevalence in the network, or by evaluating the
proportion of infected neighbors one edge, two edges, three edges, or more away from an
individual. In an earlier version of our behavioral model we used only symptomatic infectious
individuals in the calculation of perceived risk, instead of all infectious individuals. Revisiting
this implementation in the context of a community without rapid testing would also be a
valuable experiment.
As mentioned earlier, thinking more critically about the scale of influence relative to
perceived risk is another component of the model we could further consider. How important
should social influence be to decision-making relative to perceived risk? A first step would
be to explore the dynamics of more maximum incoming influence values between 0.5 and 1.
Moreover, in linear influence games, individuals’ thresholds can be negative, which allows
individuals to have a predisposition for one behavior over another. Our early experimentation
with this idea led people to mask even when there was no disease which was unrealistic.
However, this idea of predisposition towards masking, as opposed to just resistance, is one
we would like to reflect on further.
Future work may also experiment with different initial configurations of seed nodes or
behaviors. For example, we may look to assign similar masking resistances to clusters of
individuals so that they behave similarly. Alternatively, we could enforce a mask mandate
in some communities of individuals while allowing individuals outside that community to

67

Chapter 6

Taube

choose whether or not to mask. Likewise, we could assign a subset of individuals to always
mask and another subset to always not mask and then give the remaining individuals a
choice on whether or not to mask. These configurations would allow us to further explore
the coupled dynamics of masking and disease with greater control over the system.
As more data about COVID-19 becomes available, we would like to incorporate that into
the model. Specifically, more information about how infectiousness changes over time could
be added by making our β values time-dependent. Times spent in each compartment could
also be drawn from a probability distribution that aligned with current data about how long
individuals are in the latent and infectious periods.
Finally, we would like to incorporate age structure and more contact heterogeneity into
our multilayer network. We could add a school layer that differs from workplace interactions.
We could use heavier-tailed degree distributions in each layer to reflect the few individuals
that have high numbers of contacts, forming an overall degree distribution between Poisson
and power law.
This model serves as a starting point for a variety of future experiments that can help
inform predictive disease models and how scientists think about decision-making in an epidemic.
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Allard, Laurent Hébert-Dufresne, and Hao Hu, Superspreading events in the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2: Opportunities for interventions and control, PLoS
Biology 18 (2020), no. 11, e3000897.
[4] Roy M Anderson and Robert M May, Infectious diseases of humans: dynamics and
control, Oxford University Press, 1992.
[5] David T Arnold, Fergus W Hamilton, Alice Milne, Anna J Morley, Jason Viner, Marie
Attwood, Alan Noel, Samuel Gunning, Jessica Hatrick, Sassa Hamilton, et al., Patient
outcomes after hospitalisation with COVID-19 and implications for follow-up: results
from a prospective UK cohort, Thorax 76 (2020), no. 4, 399–401.
[6] Alexander Arnon, John Ricco, and Kent Smetters, Epidemiological and economic effects of lockdown, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2020).
[7] Paul G Auwaerter, Coronavirus COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2), Johns Hopkins ABX
Guide (2020).
[8] Frank Ball, Denis Mollison, and Gianpaolo Scalia-Tomba, Epidemics with two levels of
mixing, The Annals of Applied Probability (1997), 46–89.
[9] Shweta Bansal, Bryan T Grenfell, and Lauren Ancel Meyers, When individual behaviour matters: homogeneous and network models in epidemiology, Journal of the
Royal Society Interface 4 (2007), no. 16, 879–891.
[10] Yinon M Bar-On, Avi Flamholz, Rob Phillips, and Ron Milo, Science forum: SARSCoV-2 (COVID-19) by the numbers, eLife 9 (2020), e57309.
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